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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Weston Hudson appealed from the district court's judgment of 
conviction entered upon his conditional guilty plea to one count of felony possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver, asserting that the district court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable, warrantless 
investigatory detention and the subsequent unreasonable, warrantless search of a van. 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Hudson did not show that 
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the detaining officer, 
Officer Peter Klepich, had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory detention of 
Mr. Hudson, that Mr. Hudson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
van and thus had no "standing"1 to challenge the search of the van, and that, even if 
Mr. Hudson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the van, the officers were 
justified in searching the van pursuant to the vehicle exception to the warrant 
requirement. (Resp. Br., pp.4-15.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that Officer Klepich did not have 
reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory detention, and that Mr. Hudson had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the van and thus has "standing" to challenge its 
search. Mr. Hudson also challenges the State's contention that the officers were 
justified in searching the van pursuant to the vehicle exception to the warrant 
1 The Idaho Court of Appeals has noted that the term "standing" is technically 
inaccurate in this context. State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 717 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006). 
"Nevertheless, the term is often employed as useful shorthand referring to whether the 
defendant had a privacy interest in a place that was searched such that he or she is 
entitled to the exclusion of the resulting incriminating evidence." Id. 
1 
requirement, but he relies on the arguments contained in his Appellant's Brief on that 
point and will not repeat them herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hudson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hudson's motion to suppress, because the 
detention of Mr. Hudson and subsequent search of the van were in violation of 
Mr. Hudson's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hudson's Motion To Suppress, Because 
The Detention Of Mr. Hudson And Subsequent Search Of The Van Were In Violation Of 
His Constitutional Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hudson asserts that Officer Klepich did not have reasonable suspicion that 
he was involved in any criminal activity when the officer detained him. Additionally, 
Mr. Hudson asserts that the warrantless search of the van was not justified by the plain 
view exception to the warrant requirement Thus, the detention of Mr. Hudson and 
subsequent search of the van violated Mr. Hudson's constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court erred in denying Mr. Hudson's 
motion to suppress the evidence seized. 
B. Officer Klepich Detained Mr. Hudson In Violation Of His Constitutional Right To 
Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures, Because The Officer Did 
Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify His Investigatory Detention 
Mr. Hudson asserts that his investigatory detention by Officer Klepich violated his 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, because 
Officer Klepich did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. 
The State argues that Officer Klepich had reasonable suspicion to justify the 
investigatory detention, essentially on the same grounds the district court used to find 
reasonable suspicion. (See Resp. Br., pp.6-8.) Mr. Hudson asserts that the State's 
arguments on this point are incorrect for the same reasons the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress, as contained in Mr. Hudson's Appellant's Brief. (App. 
Br., pp.18-20.) Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Officer Klepich did 
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not have a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hudson was involved in any criminal activity to 
justify his detention. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009). 
The State further argues that, "Even assuming the initial detention of 
[Mr.] Hudson was impermissible, the discovery of the warrant would have justified his 
arrest and the ultimate search incident to arrest leading to his current underlying 
charge." (Resp. Br., p.8 n.2.) Although Mr. Hudson does not dispute that he had an 
outstanding warrant, his arrest on that warrant does not dissipate the taint of the illegal 
investigatory detention because there was no valid search incident to arrest in this case. 
The State has mischaracterized the search of the van as "the ultimate search 
incident to arrest leading to his current underlying charge." (See Resp. Br., p.8 n.2.) 
However, the search of the van was not, and could not have been, a valid search 
incident to arrest. In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the United States Supreme 
Court held that, "Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only 
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of 
arrest." Id. at 351. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Gant applies to vehicle searches 
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant. State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 514-15 
(2010). In Frederick, the defendant "was not within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment of his truck at the time [the officer] searched it, nor was it reasonable to 
believe the truck contained evidence of the offense for which [the defendant] was 
arrested-failure to appear." Id. at 515. Thus, the Court held that, "pursuant to Gant, 
[the officer's] warrantless search of [the defendant's] truck was unreasonable and in 
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violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. Put otherwise, the warrantless search of the 
truck in Frederick was not a valid search incident to arrest. See id. at 513-15. 
Similarly, pursuant to Gant, the search of the van here was not, and could not 
have been, a valid search incident to arrest. At the time of the search of the van, 
Mr. Hudson was handcuffed and in Officer Jessica Marley's patrol car. ( See Tr., 
Sept.11, 2012, p.11, Ls.18-21, p.16, Ls.2-11.) Thus, like the defendant in Frederick, 
see 149 Idaho at 513, 515, Mr. Hudson was not "within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search." See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
Further, like the defendant in Frederick, see 149 Idaho at 511, 515, Mr. Hudson was 
initially arrested on a warrant for failure to appear. ( See Case Summary Report, Sept. 
22, 2011, p.10;2 Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository Entry for Madison County No. 
CR 2011-2432, available at https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberSearch.do 
(reporting that, in Mr. Hudson's Madison County case, a warrant was issued for failure 
to appear on Sept. 12, 2011, and the warrant was returned on Sept. 24, 2011, after 
being served in Bonneville County).) It was therefore not reasonable to believe that the 
van contained evidence of the failure to appear offense for which Mr. Hudson was 
initially arrested. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351; Frederick, 149 Idaho at 515. Thus, the 
search of the van was not, and could not have been, a valid search incident to arrest. 
Because the search of the van was not, and could not have been, a valid search 
incident to arrest, Mr. Hudson's arrest on the outstanding warrant does not dissipate the 
taint of the illegal investigatory detention. Cf. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846-47 
(2004) (holding that the evidence found in the defendant's possession pursuant to a 
2 The Case Summary Report is attached to the PSI. 
6 
valid search incident to arrest, after the officer's discovery of an outstanding arrest 
warrant, need not be suppressed). As explained in the Appellant's Brief, application of 
the attenuation doctrine factors calls for suppression of the evidence. (App. Br., pp.21-
22.) Because the taint of the illegal investigatory detention is not sufficiently attenuated, 
the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the van was come by 
through exploitation of the illegal investigatory detention, and that evidence should be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Page, 140 Idaho at 846. 
C. Mr. Hudson Has Standing To Challenge The Warrantless Search Of The Van 
Mr. Hudson asserts that he has "standing" to challenge the warrantless search of 
the van, because he did not abandon the van prior to the search and he had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the van. 
The State argues that Mr. Hudson "voluntarily abandoned any privacy interest he 
may have had in the van and its contents when, during a lawful detention following an 
arrest pursuant to a valid warrant, he disclaimed any ownership of it." (Resp. Br., p.9.) 
According to the State, Mr. Hudson's statement to Officer Klepich that he had 
nothing to do with the van, made after the officers had already searched the van, 
"evidenced [Mr.J Hudson's abandonment of the vehicle and the property within and 
denied him of any legitimate expectation of privacy upon which to claim the search of 
the van was unlawful." (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) However, as quoted by the State (Resp. 
Br., p.9), the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "[o]ne who voluntarily abandons 
property prior to the search cannot be said to possess the requisite property." State v. 
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52 (Ct App. 1999) (emphasis added). In Harwood, the 
defendant disclaimed ownership of a fanny pack, which "amounted to an 
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abandonment," prior to the search of the pack by officers. Id. at 51-52. Similarly, in 
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), the United States Supreme Court case cited 
in Harwood, the Court held that two items of evidence were "abandoned property" 
because the defendant placed them in a wastepaper basket in his hotel room, paid his 
bill, and vacated the room prior to the search of the room by FBI agents. Abel, 362 U.S. 
at 241. 
In contrast, Mr. Hudson disavowed any connection to the van only after the 
officers searched the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.20, Ls.4-25.) Pursuant to Harwood 
and Abel, Mr. Hudson did not voluntarily abandon the van prior to the search, and thus 
he may still demonstrate that he had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to 
challenge the search. 
The State also argues that Mr. Hudson did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy3 in the van as a non-owner driver authorized to control the vehicle, because 
Mr. Hudson's grandmother, Claudia Rowe, testified at the preliminary hearing that 
Mr. Hudson was not allowed to take the van. (Resp. Br., p.11.) However, Ms. Rowe 
testified at the motion to suppress hearing that she never told Mr. Hudson he could not 
drive the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.51, Ls.8-18.) Further, Ms. Rowe had given Betty 
Hudson, her daughter and Mr. Hudson's mother, authority to allow others to drive the 
van, and Ms. Rowe was "pretty sure" Ms. Hudson had not told Mr. Hudson he could not 
drive the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.50, L.25, p.51, L.2, p.51, Ls.19-21.) Ms. Hudson 
3 To have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a place searched, a person must have a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that expectation must be 
objectively reasonable. State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626 (2008). It appears that the 
State does not contest Mr. Hudson's assertion that he had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the van. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) 
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testified that Ms. Rowe never told her that Mr. Hudson could not use the van. (Tr., 
Sept. 11, 2012, p.60, Ls.9-11.) While Ms. Hudson never specifically told Mr. Hudson he 
could use the van, she left the keys on the microwave for him and other family members 
to use. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.63, Ls.8-12.) Thus, Mr. Hudson had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the van because he was a non-owner driver authorized to 
control the vehicle. See State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 719 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Mr. Hudson did not abandon the van prior to the search, and he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the van. Thus, Mr. Hudson has "standing" to challenge the 
search of the van. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Hudson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment of 
conviction, reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Hudson's motion to suppress, 
and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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